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Abstract
How participants to a joint activity come to develop a
shared or mutual understanding of what they are
perceiving has long been a problematic issue for
philosophers, sociologists, and linguists. We examine the
abstract model proposed by Clark and Marshall (1981)
whereby speakers and hearers construct mutual
knowledge and by which discrepancies in definite
reference are repaired. We focus in particular on forms
of demonstrative reference that depend upon physical copresence. We examine an attested example of reference
repair in the operating room of a teaching hospital. It
involves learning to recognize pertinent structures within
endoscopic surgeries, that is surgeries in which internal
spaces are rendered visible by inserting a fiber-optic lens
into the body of the patient. Clark and Marshall provide
a useful vocabulary for discussing referential practices in
this applied setting. We are left with some questions
about how to interpret certain features of their model,
however. We conclude that further theoretical framing is
required before we develop a full appreciation of how
reference and reference repair is accomplished in day-today interaction.

How participants to a joint activity come to develop a
shared or mutual understanding of what they are
perceiving has long been a problematic issue for
philosophers, sociologists, and linguists (cf., Heritage,
19884; Lewis, 1969; Sperber & Wilson, 1986;
Stalnaker, 1978). One means of building "common
ground" (Clark, 1996), of course, is through
demonstrative reference. Even here, however, potential
problems abound. When one issues the utterance "It's
right here," how is it that one assures oneself that what
is presented as here is the same as what is taken as here
by the listener? Further, how do we detect when
discrepancies have arisen and how are these
discrepancies to be reconciled? We begin this paper by
reviewing the pragmatic model of reference repair
proposed by Clark and Marshall (1981). We then

examine an instance of reference repair in an applied
setting to evaluate the usefulness of this model in
understanding actual referential practice.
Clark and Marshall's Model of Reference Repair
Clark and Marshall (1981) proposed an abstract
model for the repair of direct references based on their
proposal for how mutual knowledge is constructed.
This proposal can be expressed succinctly by the
following formula:
Evidence + Assumptions + Induction Schema = Mutual
Knowledge1
where evidence is the grounds for the speaker and
hearer's belief that both understand some matter in the
same way, assumptions are the things taken for granted
when accepting these grounds as warrants, and
induction schema is a recursive formulation of Lewis'
(1969) iterative definition of common knowledge. By
this formula, evidence and assumptions are interrelated
in that weaker bases of mutuality must be compensated
by increasing levels of assumption.
Clark and
Marshall's taxonomy of evidence is broken into three
categories: community membership, physical copresence, and linguistic co-presence. 2 These evidence
types, along with their associated assumptions are listed
in Table I.
Mutual understanding proceeds on the
assumption that speakers and listeners are each
members of many different cultural communities (e.g.,

1

In later writing (see Clark, 1996), mutual knowledge was
expanded to common ground, a broader notion that subsumed
mutual belief, mutual knowledge, mutual assumptions, and
mutual awareness.
2
Clark and Marshall (1981) listed indirect co-presence as a
fourth category of evidence. For ease of presentation, we
have condensed the categories into three.

Table 1: Bases of Common Ground
(adapted from Clark & Marshall, 1981)
Evidence

Associated Assumptions

1. Community membership

co-membership, universality of knowledge

2. Physical co-presence
a. Immediate
b. Potential
c. Prior
d. Indirect potential
e. Indirect prior

simutaneity, attention, rationality
assumptions of 2a. + locatability
assumptions of 2a. + recallibility
assumptions of 2b. + associativity
assumptions of 2c. + associativity

3. Linguistic co-presence
a. Potential
b. Prior
c. Indirect potential
d. Indirect prior

African Americans, soccer fans, Presbyterians, pipe
fitters, speakers of French) and that membership in
these communities imparts special forms of shared
vocabulary and knowledge. Reference based purely on
community membership assumes that the speaker and
hearer hold one or more of these cultural communities
in common (i.e., co-membership) and that the object of
reference is known to all members of these shared
communities (i.e., universality of knowledge). Clark
and Marshall theorized that mutual knowledge based on
community membership has an extended scope and can
be carried from one conversation to another.
A second form of evidence is based on physical
co-presence. When speaker and hearer are aware of an
object present to both at the moment of reference
(sometimes referred to as "triple co-presence"), the
situation is labeled immediate co-presence. Although
this is the strongest form of co-presence for Clark and
Marshall, it too has certain assumptions. The speaker
assumes that the listener is not only oriented to the
object, but is also attending to it (attention) and that
both are attending to it at the same time (similtaneity).
It also assumes that the listener possesses the faculties
to appreciate the meaning of the utterance (rationality).
If only the speaker is focusing on the object, but it is
available to the hearer (i.e., locatability), potential
physical co-presence is established. If the hearer does
not happen to be attending to the object of reference,
but is known to have attended to it previously and can
be counted upon to remember it (recallibility), then
prior physical co-presence can be established.
Attributes of components of physically co-present
objects can be referred to indirectly provided the hearer
recognizes (via community co-membership) the
semantic links connecting the attribute or component of
the object to the object (assumption of associativity).
The third category of co-presence is linguistic. It
allows for reference to objects that have been

assumptions of 2b. + understandability
assumptions of 2c. + understandability
assumptions of 3a. + associativity
assumptions of 3b. + associativity

previously introduced into the conversation. Such
forms of co-presence are only prior or potential,
depending on whether the object is introduced earlier or
later in the stream of talk. Both types depend upon a
form of assumption Clark and Marshall refer to as
"understandibility." As with physical co-presence,
more complex forms of linguistic co-presence are
possible through association. Unlike community comembership which is sustained over long periods, Clark
and Marshall considered physical and linguistic copresence to have relatively brief temporal extent.
As evidence for their model, Clark and Marshall
direct attention to the way that speakers repair definite
references. They described two forms of reference
repair: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal repairs
involve enhancing reference by providing additional
information without altering the set of underlying
assumptions. Vertical repair, on the other hand,
involves advancing to a level of co-presence with fewer
assumptions. For example, moving from an indirect
form of co-presence to a direct form or moving from
potential to immediate co-presence or shifting from
linguistic to physical co-presence. Because community
co-membership has assumptions that are entirely
different from those underlying physical and linguistic
co-presence, it allows only for horizontal forms of
repair.
The model of reference repair presented by Clark
and Marshall was largely linguistic. Clark (1996) later
elaborated on the notion of common ground. He made
a conceptual distinction between communal common
ground, something that rests largely on community comembership, and personal common ground, with a
correspondence to what has been previously described
as physical and linguistic co-presence. He expanded
his treatment of personal common ground to include
"joint perceptual experiences" and "joint actions" (p.
112), that is gesticulation, observed actions, and other

features of the social setting in addition to talk. As we
turn to an instance of actual reference repair in an
applied setting, we see the importance of taking a
broader and more situated view of referential practice.
In particular, we begin to see some of the complexities
embedded in certain features of Clark and Marshall's
model, such as the assumption of locatability.
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Analyzing Reference in an Endoscopic Surgery
The setting within which we have chosen to study
referential practice is the operating room (OR) of a
busy teaching hospital. Within this context, there are
multiple
forms
of
work
being
performed
simultaneously. On the one hand, there is a cycle of
activity surrounding the performance of a particular
surgical procedure itself within which each of the
members of surgical team plays a specific role. At the
same time, there is instructional work to be done as
well. In the fragment to be analyzed here, one
participant ("Attending") is a highly-experienced
surgeon, ultimately responsible for the safe and
successful outcome of the surgery.
A second
("Resident") is a surgeon in the final year of his surgical
residency, who had by his own estimate participated in
80 to 90 surgeries of the type to be described here (by
comparison, the attending surgeon reported that he has
performed 1200-1300 of these surgeries over the course
of his career). The remaining participant ("Clerk") is a
third-year medical student enrolled in a clerkship
rotation.
This was his first surgical experience.
Attending, therefore, is providing guidance and
supervision to the resident and both Attending and
Resident are responsible for providing instruction to the
medical student.
The surgical procedure in which they are engaged
is a laparoscopic cholecystectomy, that is the removal
of the gall bladder with the aid of an endoscopic
camera. Such surgeries were of interest to us because
of the manifold challenges to perception and
coordination that they pose to participants. Surgeons
are called upon to translate what they see on a 2-D TV
monitor into a model of what is happening within the
not directly inspectable belly of the patient. The image
seen on the screen is a magnified view that facilitates
precise manipulation on the part of the surgeon, but can
be disorienting for newcomers. The orientation of the
view on the screen is arbitrary, though the convention is
to orient the lens in such a way that the projected image
most closely resembles what would be seen in an open
surgery (that is a ventral view in which up is anterior
and down is posterior). Since participants on opposite
sides of the operating table observe different monitors,
however, the person assisting the surgeon from the
opposite side of the table receives an inverted view.

Resident

Attending
Clerk

scrub
nurse

Figure 1. Arrangement of the operating room.
Looking within the endoscopic space is a team
effort with different members responsible for operating
the camera, "retracting" obstructing organs, and
conducting the surgery. This requires substantial
coordination in that a view of the workspace adequate
to carry out the procedure can only be achieved if all
members of the team correctly anticipate the needs of
the surgeon. Although the participants work in close
proximity to one another, many of the normal resources
for effecting mutual orientation are not available to
them. Their hands, for example, are occupied much of
the time and, as a consequence, cannot be employed for
gesture. Further, because they do not attend to the same
monitors and because the monitors are located at a
distance from where they work, it is difficult for them
to use each others' gaze as a cue for orientation as is
often done in more typical face-to-face interaction
(Goodwin, 1986; Streeck, 1993, 1994).
Attending assists the resident from the left side of
the table (see Figure 1). Clerk, standing to the left of
Resident on the right side of the table, controls the rod
lens of the endoscopic camera.
The surgery is
considered routine. It consists of isolating the small
duct (the cystic duct) through which the gallbladder
empties into the common bile duct and the vessel (the
cystic artery) that supplies the gallbladder with blood,
ligating both with surgical clips, and severing them.
The gall bladder is then gently teased from the liver and
extracted through one of the "ports" in the abdominal

wall. The greatest technical challenge is correctly
identifying the cystic duct and cystic artery, as serious
post-surgical complications may arise were clips to be
applied to the wrong structures.

Repairing Reference in the OR
Space restrictions prevent us from presenting here
a full analysis of the interaction. A more detailed
analysis of the fragment can be found elsewhere
(Koschmann, Goodwin, LeBaron, & Feltovich, in
prep). A transcript can be found in Appendix A. 3 It
begins (lines 1-9) with Attending describing the
surgical procedure to Clerk. At the same time and
throughout the course of this interaction, the resident
was performing a blunt dissection to expose the cystic
duct and the cystic artery using the tool in his right
hand (a "black grasper").
This dissection was
performed by burrowing the tip of the grasper into a
bundle of connective tissue binding the bottom edge of
the gall bladder to the common bile duct and then
gently spreading apart the jaws of the instrument.
Attending and Clerk observed his progress on their
respective monitors.
The expression cystic artery is introduced here
for the first time (line 2). In terms of Clark and
Marshall's model, Attending's use of this expression is
authorized by Clerk and Attending's membership in
some common community. Attending displays by his
choice of language a set of presuppositions about what
would be understandable to a third-year medical
student. Resident's first demonstrative reference to the
cystic artery (line 5) specifies a region in which the
cystic artery can be found, though it may not
necessarily be visible at the moment in which he makes
the reference. In Clark and Marshall's terminology,
therefore, these references signal potential physical copresence. This raises interesting questions about what
the assumption of locatability means in this particular
situation, however. If it means that the cystic artery is
simply available to Clerk's viewing, Resident's
utterance would suggest that he believed the cystic
artery to be locatable at the moment of reference. If
one has never seen a cystic artery on an endoscopic
display, however, is it still locatable there?
Clerk's query in line 10 makes visible his
orientation to unfolding process. The cystic artery may
or may not be visible at that point in time, but his use of
the adverb yet expresses a confidence that it will
eventually be made manifest to all. Attending's reply in
line 13 ratifies this view. Like Goodwin's (1999)
archeologists excavating through sedimented strata of
soil, surgeons must dissect through various layers of

anatomical structure.
They speak of planes of
dissection, meaning the surfaces available to sight at
specific junctures within a procedure. In an endoscopic
surgery, however, the cystic artery will never be
physically co-present in the same way that it would in
an open surgery since its presence is mediated through
a video viewing system. Attending's deictic particle
here, therefore, anchors not to the conventional origo of
the speaker's corporal location, but rather to a virtual
origo located in the shared media space.
Resident eventually provides six separate
demonstrations of the cystic artery before receiving a
tentative sign of recognition on the part of Clerk (line
19).4 Learning to locate pertinent structures on the
video display is an important aspect of "professional
vision" (Goodwin, 1994). Resident's there (line 18) was
coordinated with a point to a white stripe within the
bundle of connective tissue being viewed. Although
gesture is often characterized by linguists as
supplementing speech, Hindmarsh and Heath (2000)
described instances in which "The deictic term
segments the gesture, displaying just the moment at
which it is sequentially relevant" such that "the talk
reflexively works on behalf of the gesture" (p. 15).
Resident's repeated efforts to demonstrate the
cystic artery, could be described in terms of Clark and
Marshall's model of reference repair as an attempt to
eliminate the assumption of locatability. That is, he
was striving to promote his shared knowledge with
Clerk from potential to immediate co-presence. But
what does it really mean to be "locatable." The whole
idea of "professional vision" is to acquire the ability to
see as presumably more-skilled others can see. If
locatability assumes not only that the listener can see
(in the sense of having adequate vision, an unblocked
view, etc.) what is visible to the speaker, but must also
be able to see in the same ways as the speaker (i.e.,
share the speaker's "professional vision"), then it
becomes a very complex kind of assumption, in many
ways just as complex as the thing it sets out to explain,
namely mutual understanding.
As the fragment continues, Attending raises some
concerns about Resident's identification of the cystic
artery. On paper, Attending's "That may be right" (line
27) might be construed as a tentative positive appraisal.
Resident's reply (line 29), however, treats it as an
incomplete utterance, as in "That may be right
[hepatic]." Resident's efforts to achieve mutual
understanding with Clerk, therefore, have revealed a
potential discrepancy in understanding among Resident
and Attending. The fragment concludes with Resident

4
3

The transcription conventions used here are described in
Atkinson and Heritage (1984).

Resident's demonstrative reference in line 3 ("Right there")
is heard to be referring to the cystic duct, a topic of discussion
prior to the transcribed segment, rather than the cystic artery.

and Attending resolving to search further for the cystic
artery.

Discussion
Here in a nutshell we see the problem of mutual
knowledge. Resident takes some pains to demonstrate
to Clerk what he (Resident) believes to be the cystic
artery. After some prompting, Clerk declares that he
now sees it. Other than his avowal, however, we have
no evidence that he indeed sees what Resident has
taken such trouble to display. In demonstrating for
Clerk what he has taken to be the cystic artery,
however, Resident has inadvertently made visible a
discrepancy in his presumed common ground with
Attending (or, at the very least, a difference in their
levels of confidence that the indicated structure is in
fact the cystic artery). Clark (1996) defined grounding
as establishing a claim "as a part of common ground
well enough for current purposes" (p. 221). For the
purposes of Clerk's instruction, the exchange would
seem to have provided ample grounding for his
understanding.
However, for the purposes of
conducting a safe surgery, the concerns raised by
Attending might suggest that more grounding is
required.
Clark and Marshall provide a useful vocabulary
for discussing referential practices in this applied
setting. Their model of reference repair, however,
hinges upon a calculus of assumption maintenance and
herein lies the rub. The conceptual difficulties of
mutual knowledge that their model was meant to
address have not been completely dispelled, but,
instead, arise in new forms when we look more
carefully at the underlying assumptions. As we have
seen, the assumption of locatability can be quite
complex when examined in situ. We are in full accord
with Clark's shift from a treatment of reference as a
simple matter of linguistic interpretation to a more
situated model that encompasses "joint actions" and
"joint perceptual experiences" and we think that this
will lead to a richer understanding of concepts like
locatability. For one thing, it would help to illuminate
how participants' own unfolding activities contribute to
the determinant sense of what is seeable at any given
moment. Furthermore, we have much to learn about the
interactions between different kinds of bases of shared
understanding. Professional vision, for example, draws
upon the associated assumptions of both community
membership and physical co-presence.
In a situation in which the establishment of
common ground is essential, we see just how elusive
shared understanding can be to achieve. Our analysis of

the fragment of interaction in the OR would suggest
that we have a way to go before fully appreciating how
these factors enter into our day-to-day practices of
reference and reference repair.
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